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Abstract
This paper examines the consequences of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption in Ukraine through the lens 
of New Institutional Accounting theory. IFRS adoption's effects on management's reporting incentives, enforcement and institutional 
complementarities are analysed. I find that adoption at a technical level is not enough to be called "adoption" as profound changes 
at the institutional level are also required. Adopted IFRS are subjected to the same type of institutional and market pressures that 
gave rise to the old set of standards and as a result, the practice of financial reporting is unchanged at its core while only new technical 
rules apply. Hence, jurisdictions should not pursue only technical adoption but should also try their best to align as close as possible 
all institutional aspects of this issue. The best advice for all jurisdictions with an institutional infrastructure similar to Ukraine's is 
to strengthen management's reporting incentives and enforcement mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
have become a veritable lingua franca in global account-
ing today. The IFRS's publisher the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) claims that 144 juris-
dictions now require the use of IFRS Standards for all or 
most publicly listed companies, whilst a further 12 juris-
dictions permit its use (IFRS Foundation). If we apply 
less strict parameters such as "permitted but not required 
for domestic public companies", then only a few jurisdic-
tions, namely Guatemala, Japan, Madagascar, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Suriname, Switzerland, Timor-Leste 
are left uncovered, while the overwhelming majority of 
world countries require or else permit IFRS use (IFRS 
Foundation). Nevertheless, the question of whether finan-
cial reporting practices are comparable is not solved for 
good as the statistics above describe comparability only in 
terms of "technical mentality", as we call it, and they do 
not pay attention to the institutional mechanisms that are 
operational in the host jurisdiction.
There is a growing number of studies disputing and 
questioning whether adoption of global standards across 
jurisdictions has truly taken place, due to "layering of IFRS 
and Dual Institutionality" (Alexander and Alon, 2017; 
Alon, 2013), local factors (Alon and Dwyer, 2014; 
Judge et al., 2010), national patterns of accounting 
within IFRS (Nobes and Stadler, 2013) and institutional 
differences between jurisdictions (Daske et al., 2008; 
Daske et al., 2013; Hail et al., 2010a; 2010b; Wysocki, 2011). 
The IFRS Project has always developed under the umbrella 
of harmonisation of accounting practices across the board 
(Baker and Barbu, 2007) and – later – convergence of 
accounting standards (Zeff, 2012), but dissenting voices 
in different guises have derailed even the possibility of 
uniform adoption of IFRS across the world.
In the last decade, the catchword of IASB has been 
"adoption" of IFRS, but as Nobes and Zeff fittingly put 
it there are instances of "adoption that do not deserve the 
name" (Nobes and Zeff, 2016:p.284). Furthermore, the 
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more countries adopt the IFRS "the population of adopters 
is … larger and still shows great variety" (Nobes and Zeff, 
2016:p.284). There are also so-called "label adopters" - 
companies who adopt IAS just in name without any mate-
rial changes to their reporting policies (Daske et al., 2013).
The most developed and most significant theory from 
a research perspective is the theory of New Institutional 
Accounting, which denies the possibility of comparabil-
ity of financial statements, even when using the same set 
of standards, due to differences in reporting incentives, 
the enforcement mechanisms that are in place and insti-
tutional complementarities. Consequently, earlier stud-
ies have yielded some tangible results and as of today, 
we have a developed research area – New Institutional 
Accounting (NIA) – that deals with the issue of adoption 
of global accounting standards in a given jurisdiction.
Equipped with NIA terms and methodology I will anal-
yse the way a single country – Ukraine – has gone through 
the adoption of the IFRS and ascertain to what extent the 
IFRS in Ukraine have been "adopted" in the way NIA 
studies understand it at an institutional level. However, 
unlike the methods previously employed in NIA research, 
I will use a qualitative approach and rely on interpretative 
tools. To the best of my knowledge this type of research 
(a mainly qualitative approach based on one jurisdiction) 
has rarely been employed in NIA and I am aware of only 
one similar study (Ball et al., 2003). I would like to empha-
sise that my interpretative approach was only possible due 
to the fact that prior studies uncovered some regularities 
in the adoption of IFRS, and with the help of the estab-
lished theory of NIA professed by many leading research-
ers from both sides of the Atlantic.
In contrast to almost all representatives of NIA who 
have constructed their research based on positivistic 
tools, and as a rule have employed across-country stud-
ies of institutions or descriptive cluster analyses, our 
approach leans more toward the interpretivist paradigm 
and is distinctive in its critical analysis of IFRS' adoption 
in Ukraine: it features one jurisdiction, one country, and 
longitudinal analysis.
In this paper, I aim to explicate the case of Ukraine and 
answer the question: did Ukraine adopt the IFRS? And 
based on Ukraine's case and NIA theory attempt to answer 
the larger question: institutionally, speaking are global 
accounting standards truly adoptable? Owing to the simi-
larity of institutional settings in all former post-Soviet coun-
tries my results could be applied to other jurisdictions in that 
area. Hence, in this paper I intend to apply the new institu-
tional accounting approach to a real country case study.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. 
It fills in a lacuna concerning Ukraine in the accounting / 
financial reporting literature, deepening our understand-
ing of those processes in the biggest country in Europe 
in terms of area. This study also contributes to the litera-
ture on the importance of preparers' reporting incentives, 
as it argues for the necessity of changes in incentives along 
with the technical standards. The paper also makes a con-
tribution on a descriptive level towards depicting a com-
prehensive case study of the adoption of the IFRS by a 
developing country with code law legal system, which is 
significant as a common law legal system is considered 
to be a native element for IFRS. The papers also make 
a contribution to assessing the impact of "new" elements 
of institutional accounting as opposed to its "hard" or "old" 
features. It also sheds light on the situation in Ukraine's 
current accounting, legal and economic systems. Finally, 
this work contributes to the analysis of the "travel of 
accounting ideas" (Ezzamel and Xiao, 2011) from devel-
oped to emerging economies.
The article is structured as follows. In the next section, 
I will explicate the main tenets of NIA and its develop-
ment up to the present day. A brief overview of Ukraine's 
transition to the IFRS is included in the second section. 
The third section explicates Ukraine's transformation 
from national to global accounting standards. The pen-
ultimate section is devoted to the elucidation and dis-
cussion of Ukraine's transformations in terms of three 
main aspects of NIA: reporting incentives, enforcement 
and institutional complementarities. The paper concludes 
with a discussion.
2 New institutional accounting theory
Institutions are seen as mechanisms facilitating economic 
exchange in society between different actors. Douglas 
C. North, who alongside Robert W. Fogel got the 1993 
Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences "for having renewed 
research in economic history by applying economic the-
ory and quantitative methods to explain economic and 
institutional change" (Lennart, 1993), proposed a defini-
tion of institutions as the "humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction" (North, 1990:p.3) that pro-
vide the "rules of the game in society" (North, 1990:p.3) 
where the actions of players (organisations) are governed 
by rules (institutions) (North, 1990).
In a neoclassical economy, as was rightly noted by 
R. Coase (1960), transaction costs are not accounted for 
and equal zero. However, a group of authors (Barzel, 1982; 
Becker, 1965; North, 1981) later indicated that transaction 
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costs can be significant if it is difficult to determine the 
quality and quantity of units to be exchanged when there 
are problems with the enforcement of the exchange. If this 
is the case, economic actors have incentives for opportu-
nistic behaviour, which is, after all, a barrier to trade and 
can stifle exchange.
Institutions, therefore, emerge to reduce and combat 
opportunistic behaviour and to increase trade benefits. 
Institutions can significantly reduce transaction costs, 
lower information and information asymmetry costs, lower 
coordination costs, secure ownership, and prevent other 
potential market failures (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; 
Coase, 1937).
On the other hand, when there is a great accumulation of 
different institutions and many interconnections between 
them, it takes a great deal of effort to bring this system to a 
working condition and moreover, to enforce it. This could 
result in the extended power of state authority and create 
opportunities for some influential actors to take advantage 
of situations for their own benefit and this, in turn, may 
lead to the same results inherent to a society without insti-
tutions – inefficient contracting (Wysocki, 2011).
So, both situations – when institutions are fledgling or 
lacking, or when there is excessive state involvement – are 
unhealthy; in practice, one has to balance the trade-off that 
exists between the two extremities of disorder, i.e. the costs 
of opportunistic behaviour in economic exchanges and 
dictatorship, i.e. the costs of state control with its unequal 
distribution of coercive power (Djankov et al., 2003).
 The term "new institutional accounting" (NIA) is used 
to describe relatively recent (the early 2000s) research 
advances made in studying the interactions of market 
forces, laws, regulations, standards, enforcement activi-
ties and other "institutions" and how they affect corporate 
financial reporting and disclosure outcomes (Leuz and 
Wysocki, 2016).
NIA is a strain of research which explores "the deter-
minants, outcomes, and interplay between reporting and 
other non-reporting institutions, mostly in cross-coun-
try comparisons" (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016:p.595). 
This branch of studies analyses the associations of non-re-
porting institutional variables (which include legal sys-
tems, the properties of other legal institutions, capital 
market features, political systems, the tax system and 
enforcement, cultural features and corruption) and inter-
national differences in disclosures and reporting prac-
tices. NIA examines various aspects of countries' financial 
reporting systems, which include accounting standards, 
securities and disclosures regulation, reporting enforce-
ment, and audit enforcement.
NIA arose as a critical response to the widely held 
belief and approach professed by the IASB that uniform 
global standards are preferable to disparate standards 
across jurisdictions. The spread of IFRS around the globe 
has always been justified by improvements in reporting 
quality and the comparability of financial reporting across 
firms and countries, but NIA researchers dispute it.
NIA proponents reject those arguments as "it is not 
obvious, nor has it been empirically documented, that one 
set of mandated global accounting regulations, let alone 
the specific standards that comprise IFRS, are superior to 
other standards and that uniform standards are preferred to 
other possible scenarios" (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016:p.594). 
NIA avers that it is insufficient to just adopt a set of 
standards to be able to assert that accounting and finan-
cial statements are harmonised as "the determinants and 
outcomes of both accounting institutions (including IFRS) 
and non-accounting institutions are fundamentally inter-
twined" (Wysocki, 2011:p.322). There need to be some 
complementary institutions to support the effective appli-
cation and enforcement of uniform global standards. 
Often, the absence of such institutions leads to results 
that are the opposite of what was intended as "there is an 
inherent interdependency and complementarity between 
reporting and non-reporting institutions in each country" 
(Leuz and Wysocki, 2016:p.595).
The proponents of NIA are adamant that "the presence 
of other man-made institutions that affect the supply of, 
and demand for, financial information. These other insti-
tutions include the legal system, corporate governance 
mechanisms, and the existence and enforcement of laws 
governing investor protection and disclosure standards" 
(Wysocki, 2011:p.312).
NIA researchers maintain that the importance of 
accounting standards for the quality of corporate report-
ing "is more limited than often thought. Other supporting 
institutions play an important role in determining report-
ing outcomes. Academic studies suggest that firms' under-
lying economics and managerial reporting incentives, 
as well as the enforcement of standards, are at least as 
important as accounting standards in influencing report-
ing practices" (Hail et al., 2010a:p.386).
It is worth noting that new institutional accounting the-
ory is a theoretical construction combining the "hard" or 
"old" institutional approach (as is the case for example with 
institutional complementarities and partly enforcement 
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professed by NIA) and a new institutional approach evi-
dent in the analysis of the reporting incentives of compa-
nies and individuals.
This new institutional approach manifests itself in 
emphasis on practice as opposed to theory. NIA pro-
ponents argue that even assuming that the country has 
adopted standards at a given point in time, the assump-
tion that their practices will be harmonised over time is 
questionable (Hail et al., 2010a; Leuz, 2010; Leuz and 
Wysocki, 2016; Wysocki, 2011). That is because this new 
set of standards will be subjected to the same type of insti-
tutional and market pressures that gave rise to the old set 
of standards. Inevitably, the newly adopted sets of stan-
dards will drift apart over time due to local factors espe-
cially if "the new, harmonised standards are not a good fit 
for the other institutions" (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016:p.595). 
It therefore follows that, despite the global convergence 
in reporting standards, convergence in reporting prac-
tices is scarcely attainable (Hail et al., 2010a; Leuz and 
Wysocki, 2016; Wysocki, 2011).
There are three salient points from NIA framework, 
namely:
1. reporting incentives; 
2. the enforcement mechanism and 
3. complementarities and analysis of the institutional 
environment.
2.1 Reporting incentives
NIA's assertion about incentives could be linked to 
D. North (1990) who argued that institutions are "the 
rules of the game" that define the incentives for members 
of the society. The main NIA hypothesis is that "actual 
reporting changes are ultimately driven by changes in the 
underlying incentives" (Daske et al., 2013:p.498); again, 
the emphasis is on practice as opposed to mere theory. 
Management's reporting incentives are a proxy for assess-
ing the underlying motivations for the accounting change. 
When reporting incentives are unchanged or have under-
gone only slight adjustments, then there are no reasons to 
expect any momentum in terms of changes to "accounting 
on the ground".
Ball et al. (2003) showed that even countries with 
high-quality accounting standards may have large differ-
ences in reporting quality due to differences in institution-
ally grounded incentives.
As Nobes and Stadler fittingly remarked "even if all 
entities are complying with IFRS, the incentives of pre-
parers and enforcers remain "primarily local"" (Nobes 
and Stadler, 2013:p.574). Preparers are grounded in local 
habits, traditions, and culture while at the same time they 
are forced to adopt international standards which are often 
inherently underpinned by different sets of values.
However, we are obliged to broaden our circle of incen-
tive holders and to include in our analysis not only pre-
parers' incentives but those of auditors. Karampinis and 
Hevas pointed out the factors that can create an "unfa-
vourable environment" for IFRS adoption and "undermine 
managers' and auditors' incentives for high-quality finan-
cial reporting" (Karampinis and Hevas, 2011:p.304).
Thus, incentives are very important as "incentives 
dominate [IFRS] in determining accounting quality" 
(Ramanna and Sletten, 2009:p.29), but so far "preparer 
incentives have received insufficient attention in the anal-
ysis of such issues" (Ball et al., 2003:p.261).
Ball et al. are unequivocal that "it is misleading to 
classify countries by standards, ignoring incentives, as 
is common in international accounting texts, transpar-
ency indexes, and IAS advocacy" (Ball et al., 2003:p.236). 
That is why the main hypothesis of NIA is that "the 
observed economic consequences around IAS adoptions 
depend on management's reporting incentives, including 
the underlying motivations for the accounting change, 
rather than the change in accounting standards per se" 
(Daske et al., 2013:p.497). Even broad macro institutions 
(like legal systems, where the distinction between com-
mon law and code law is noteworthy) can be shown to 
influence firms' reporting practices (Ball et al., 2000).
Some authors also analyse political incentives, observ-
able in instances such as the withholding of bad news during 
periods of political uncertainty, or the withholding of good 
news and release of bad news around the peak time of the 
anti-corruption campaign in China (Wang and Gu, 2019).
Which factors play a role in incentives formation? There 
is a common position here that preparer incentives depend 
on "the interplay between market and political forces in 
the reporting jurisdiction" (Ball et al., 2003:p.236).
Hail et al. describe these forces in detail: 
1. a country's legal institutions, e.g., the rule of law; 
2. the strength of the enforcement regime, e.g., auditing; 
3. capital market forces, e.g., the need to raise outside 
capital; 
4. product market competition; 
5. a firm's compensation, ownership and governance 
structure, and 
6. its operating characteristics (Hail et al., 2010a). 
Wysocki further adds 
7. a country's "baseline factor endowments" (Wysocki, 
2011:p.315).
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2.2 Enforcement
According to the Standard no. 1 on financial information 
("Enforcement of standards on financial information in 
Europe"), enforcement may be defined as: "monitoring 
compliance of the financial information with the appli-
cable reporting framework; and taking appropriate mea-
sures in case of infringements discovered in the course 
of enforcement" (The Committee of European Securities 
Regulators, 2003:p.2).
Brown and Tarca identify three major components of 
the enforcement process: 
1. effective company control systems and management 
dedicated to good reporting, 
2. independent auditors who are experts on the rules, and 
3. an oversight mechanism with sufficient expertise 
and power to achieve effective enforcement (Brown 
and Tarca, 2005).
NIA shows that both legal and enforcement institu-
tions in a country are important determinants of corporate 
reporting quality (Leuz et al., 2003).
The enforcement activities of tax authorities and 
the development of the auditing profession can affect 
financial reporting properties and disclosure outcomes 
(Wysocki, 2011). Empirical studies have noted and con-
firmed that written legislation may be similar or even bet-
ter than in Western European countries, but their imple-
mentation in terms of enforcement mechanisms being put 
in place is rather inefficient (Albu et al., 2017).
Enforcement is a vital part of what needs to be fixed 
since "the unsophisticated users of financial reports, the 
low level of enforcement or the poor investors' protection 
laws are some of the institutional features characterising 
many of the CEE countries" (Albu et al., 2017:p.254).
Hail et al. stressed that stricter enforcement and better 
reporting incentives "imply that firms are less likely to get 
away with adopting IFRS merely as a label, i.e., without 
materially changing their reporting practices" (Hail et al., 
2010a:p.363). Moreover, it is established that "the capital 
market benefits exist only in countries with strict enforce-
ment regimes and in institutional environments that pro-
vide strong reporting incentives" (Hail et al., 2010a:p.365). 
That is why a stricter enforcement mechanism generally 
leads to a lower cost of capital (Wysocki, 2011).
However, it should be stressed that when I refer to new 
institutional accounting, this does not just mean public 
enforcement. Public enforcement is complemented by strong 
private enforcement (as is the case, for example, in the USA), 
threatening litigation, and potentially huge monetary penal-
ties for managers, directors, and corporations that engage in 
reporting fraud and misdeeds (Hail et al., 2010a).
New institutional accounting goes far beyond mere proper 
enforcement of the accounting standards because strict 
enforcement only limits the amount of discretion that man-
agers have and does not eliminate it (Hail et al., 2010a).
Hail et al. claim that even in a hypothetical world with 
perfect enforcement, observed reporting behaviour "will 
differ across firms as long as the accounting standards 
offer discretion, and there are differences in reporting 
incentives across firms" (Hail et al., 2010a:p.360).
2.3 Complementarities
When "many institutional elements tend to move together 
and are observed as "bundles"" (Wysocki, 2011:p.314) 
then we can talk about complementarities.
"The existence of complementarities between institu-
tions implies that countries with different endowments of 
institutions are likely to select different accounting stan-
dards. As a result, historical differences in accounting 
standards across countries existed because of the corre-
sponding variation in related institutions across coun-
tries. The complementarities between various account-
ing and non-accounting institutions also suggest that 
changes to a country's accounting standards cannot be 
considered in isolation from other institutions in a coun-
try. In other words, a change in accounting standards 
may make a country's overall economy worse off even 
though the proposed accounting change may, in isolation, 
seem beneficial for corporate financial reporting quality" 
(Wysocki, 2011:p.318).
3 Ukraine's transformation from national to global 
accounting standards
Ukraine is a country of the former Soviet Union, which in 
1991 has regained its independence and has begun to carry 
out economic reforms aimed at building a market econ-
omy. These efforts have had a variable effect, as Ukraine 
ranked in 2018 as 58th in the world in terms of the sheer vol-
ume of its GDP (The World Bank). For analysis purposes, 
I believe that it would be fair to specify periods of institu-
tional development of accounting and financial reporting 
in Ukraine that commence after the country regained inde-
pendence in 1991. 1991-1999 – the continuation of the old 
mechanisms or, as P. Bourdieu would say, the formation 
of a new Habitus (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2013). 2000-
2011 – the emergence of national accounting standards that 
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determined what the financial statements were. National 
standards were strictly based on international standards. 
2012 – Transition to IFRS for a large number of enterprises 
and the requirement for their mandatory application.
Initially, Ukraine had several paths to pursue in terms 
of IFRS implementation: 
1. the application of IFRS as national standards as it is; 
2. Developing national accounting standards based on 
IFRS; 
3. Developing national accounting standards autono-
mously from IFRSs (Pasko, 2011).
At the outset, Ukraine chose a path to develop national 
Accounting Standards (Standards) based on basic IFRS 
concepts. The first step was the adoption by the Resolution 
of Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine from 29.10.1998 which 
specified programmes of reforming the accounting sys-
tem using international accounting standards (Cabinet of 
Ministers of Ukraine, 1998). This document attributed 
"the creation of a system of national regulations (stan-
dards) for accounting and reporting that will provide 
the necessary information to users, especially investors" 
and "ensuring linkage of accounting reformation with 
the main tendencies of harmonisation of standards at the 
international level, together with the state of the economic 
and legal environment and market relations in Ukraine" 
(Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 1998).
On January 1, 2000, the Law of Ukraine came into force 
"On Accounting and Financial Reporting in Ukraine", 
which set out the main provisions of accounting and report-
ing, legally establishing the rights of all user groups to 
get accurate information about business activity through 
accounting and reporting according to the National 
accounting regulations (standards) that cannot contravene 
international standards. This was the second stage of IFRS 
implementation in Ukraine (Law of Ukraine, 1999).
The next – and third – step was the government deci-
sion to implement international accounting standards by 
adopting the State Securities and Exchange Commission 
of the stock market decision No. 112 of 04/01/2003 on 
"Guidelines for the transformation of financial statements 
of Ukrainian enterprises in IAS financial statements". 
The State Commission on Securities and Stock Market 
decided to recommend the regulation to issuers whose 
securities are admitted to trading in organised markets, 
professional stock market participants, putting into prac-
tice the methodological recommendations on the transfor-
mation of financial statements of Ukrainian enterprises 
into financial statements for IAS (SCSSM, 2003).
In June 2011, the Verkhovna Rada, the parliament of 
Ukraine, adopted amendments to the Law "On Accounting 
and Financial Reporting in Ukraine". According to these 
amendments public joint-stock companies, banks, insur-
ers, as well as enterprises carrying out economic activities 
by types, the list of which is determined by the Cabinet of 
Ministers of Ukraine had been compelled to prepare the 
financial statements and consolidated financial statements 
by international standards only.
The next stage was the adoption by the Cabinet 
Ministerial Order of February 22 2012 No. 157-p. 
"On Creating Conditions for the Implementation of 
International Financial Reporting Standards" (Cabinet of 
Ministers of Ukraine, 2012). According to this order, the 
Ministry of Finance should ensure that the International 
Financial Reporting Standards are officially published 
and that they are consistent with the original and have 
been updated in a timely manner, and in addition approve, 
by April 1, 2012, guidance on tax filing with enter-
prise income tax using accounting data and compliance 
International Financial Reporting Standards. This was 
a very important watershed moment as, first of all, from 
now on, financial statements and tax statements would be 
merged in one and secondly, IFRSs according to amend-
ments are considered those standards that are formally 
published on the website of the Ministry of Finance of 
Ukraine (Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, 2020), so 
effectively from this point, Ukraine's approach morphed 
to "adoption of IFRS as they are". At that point, and up 
to now in practice, the standards used in Ukraine differ 
from IFRS only to the extent that there is a translation lag 
affecting the use of language. It should, however, be borne 
in mind that at this time financial reporting in accordance 
with international standards was not compulsory for all 
enterprises, but only for certain groups of them.
The next step was the adoption of the Ministry of 
Finance Order of 07.02.2013 No. 73 on approval of the new 
National Accounting Standard (NAS) 1 "General Financial 
Reporting Requirements" (Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, 
2013), which replaced Accounting standards 1, 2, 3, 4 and 
5, which had previously and separately determined the 
order of submission of each of the main forms of financial 
reporting. The changes were intended to bring accounting 
and financial reporting in accordance with national stan-
dards closer to international accounting standards.
Before the enactment of NAS 1, entities that prepared 
financial statements according to international standards 
used the same form (blank) as those companies using 
national one. The only difference was the mark that was 
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put at the top of the form, stating that it is completed in 
accordance with international standards!
Institutional adoption occurred but encountered consid-
erable difficulties, as not only the provisions of the inter-
national standards but also the concepts themselves were 
new to accountants in Ukraine. A very heated discussion 
was held, for example, on fair value as opposed to histori-
cal value. Unaccustomed to the freedom of action offered 
by IFRS, Ukraine's accounting communities were at a loss 
regarding what to do and they sought clarification from the 
state authorities as in the past, they had received not stan-
dards but clear rules delineating every move.
Thus, adoption at the level of "technical mentality" has 
been dealt with, but what about the bigger picture, taking 
into account underlying institutional differences? This I 
will call "institutional adoption" and it is analysed in the 
next section.
4 Analysis of Ukraine's transformation through the 
lens of NIA
A former socialist country, with code law and fledgeling 
market economy, Ukraine was hardly a good institutional 
fit for IFRS. Consequently, from the start in Ukraine there 
was an "unfavourable environment" for IFRS adoption 
(Karampinis and Hevas, 2011).
An analysis of Ukraine's transformation through the 
lens of NIA may usefully start with the question: Why has 
Ukraine striven to adopt IFRS in the first place? We iden-
tified several points that reoccurred constantly in the 
authorities' rhetoric: 
1. there was no reason at all to autonomously develop 
something that has already been developed else-
where in the world; 
2. IFRS represent great transparency in reporting and 
that would be instrumental in attracting foreign 
investment; 
3. adoption of IFRS would significantly ease the finan-
cial reporting requirement for international compa-
nies already operating in the country; 
4. IFRS at home would be conducive for local compa-
nies to quote their share on a foreign stock exchange. 
There was also institutional isomorphism, as global 
institutions like World Bank and IIMF insisted upon 
the adoption of IFRS as a condition for the granting 
of financial aid.
So, as we can see the technical mentality prevails, the 
motto being: we will adopt the new international stan-
dards, and everything will change immediately. However, 
from the perspective of New Institutional Accounting 
and the Institutional Economy, some institutions can be 
changed fairly quickly (historically) over 20 years, and 
some institutions take a long time to change.
So how did Ukraine's transformation fare if we look at it 
through the lens of NIA theory? We can choose two start-
ing points – from 2000 or 2011 – but in any case, there is no 
major difference between these periods, the only distinction 
being that from 2000 to 2011, there was a gradual adoption 
of IFRS through alignment with the principles laid down 
in national Ukrainian standards. Thus, from this point on 
"before" should be taken to refer to the state of affairs before 
2011, and "after" to mean post-2011. The analysis that now 
follows considers the situations that obtained before and 
after this year using the main tenets of NIA.
4.1 On incentives
Two major forces influence incentives: market forces and 
political forces. Market forces play their part in forming 
reporting incentives through the demand for high-quality 
financial reporting. Some of the indicators at play here are 
the amount of publicly traded equity, the size of the mar-
ket for public debt, and the extent of private versus public 
contracting in the economy.
The trading volumes on Ukrainian stock exchanges 
are low, amounting in 2018 to 19.8 per cent of Ukraine's 
annual GDP in 2017 – 15.7 (NSSMC, 2018). Moreover, pre-
dominantly (69% in 2018 and 55% in 2017) it is trade with 
Ukrainian domestic government bonds (NSSMC, 2018). 
There is a handful of companies local to Ukraine but with 
a listing on a foreign stock exchange (Pasko et al., 2019). 
If companies want to raise funds, they go abroad, not the 
Ukrainian stock exchange.
Fledgling stock infrastructure is also to blame for 
market forces having only weak incentivising potential. 
For example, in their study Daske et al. (2013) categorised 
three types of indicator to identify major changes in firm-
level reporting incentives, namely input-based incentives, 
output-based incentives, and lastly, scrutiny by analysts 
and markets, a factor which significantly shapes manage-
ment's reporting incentives (Daske et al., 2013). The third 
indicator – scrutiny by analysts and markets – is badly 
needed in Ukraine as it does not exist as a category at all.
Some authors claim that "political incentives are prev-
alent in emerging markets' firms" (Wang and Gu, 2019), 
but since Ukraine has a historic tradition of democracy, 
political incentives have never played the kind of role that 
they do in China, for example – a traditional and collec-
tive society. The first Ukrainian constitution so-called the 
Pasko
Period. Polytech. Soc. Man. Sci., 30(1), pp. 36–48, 2022|43
Constitution of Pylyp Orlyk was signed on 5 April 1710 
and it is considered to be the first European constitution 
which is based on the democratic principles of the state 
structure (Vaščenko, 2019). We do not experience any 
political incentives in Ukraine and we do not know of 
examples of financial statements being prepared in such 
a way as not to aggravate the political situation.
In Ukraine, there is another reason why incentives to 
prepare financial statements are weak: weak market pres-
sure. Today, most, and perhaps the vast majority, of com-
panies make financial statements because the state author-
ity, in the guise of the appropriate bodies, requires it of 
them. Consequently, financial reporting in Ukraine is sim-
ply a tool of statistics, whereas in a market environment it 
is a tool of competitive advantage. That is why some princi-
ples of preparation of financial statements are misinterpreted 
in Ukraine. For example, there exists a principle in account-
ing known as prudence, which means that one should apply 
such asset evaluation methods that would prevent the under-
estimation of liabilities and expenses and the overestimation 
of assets and income. The Ukrainian accountant in his/her 
local mentality often considers the opposite option: overes-
timation of liabilities and expenses and the underestimation 
of assets and income. Things are "the other way around", but 
why? The answer is simple: a Ukrainian accountant, whose 
mentality (an informal institution, by the way) has been 
formed in prior conditions is accustomed to preparing finan-
cial statements in such a way as to reduce taxable income, 
meaning that he/she is keen to overestimate liabilities and 
expenses and underestimate assets and income, not the other 
way around. In a market economy, when reporting is a tool 
of competitive advantage, incentives work in the opposite 
direction – the higher the profit, the better. And the market 
teaches this, but it does require a true market economy with 
a strong stock market and strong competition.
The fact that the adoption of international standards 
was said to have taken place by apologists for the "techni-
cal mentality" can be demonstrated by one simple obser-
vation. Before national financial reporting provisions 
came into force, companies that submitted financial state-
ments following international standards and those who did 
so by Ukrainian standards did so in a single format. How, 
then, did they differentiate according to which conceptual 
approach financial statements were prepared? The answer 
is ridiculous: by a tick in the appropriate box. This again 
emphasises the striking difference between the mental-
ity or habitus (in P. Bourdieu's terminology) of Ukrainian 
accountants and the mentality inherent in IFRS. Here, we 
emphasise that IFRS does not provide a format, and there 
is only a minimum of items that should be included in the 
financial statements and required financial statements to 
be submitted in an appropriate format, something which 
runs counter to the spirit of international standards.
Professional judgment is a term often used in IFRS. 
It is a fundamental term because IFRS are based on prin-
ciples. When in doubt, we should turn to the principles and 
apply professional judgment. But professional judgment 
represents a form of freedom, and freedom according to 
E. Fromm (1994) is what a person wants to escape from. 
And in the previous example, we can trace this desire 
to escape from freedom.
What I have described here applies to most, the vast 
majority of companies; however, for the sake of fairness, 
it should be noted that there are several Ukrainian com-
panies listed on international stock markets and, accord-
ingly, the financial reporting incentives that apply to them 
were created by this foreign environment; moreover, very 
often the internal preparers of financial reporting in those 
companies (CFOs) have been schooled in IFRS, as they 
are from Western countries.
To summarise, incentives are only weakly developed, 
which means that significant efforts still need to be made 
to bring about true IFRS adoption in Ukraine. To come 
about, this true adoption must be reflected primarily in the 
development of market incentives for financial reporting.
4.2 On enforcement
Concerning enforcement, the first thing to be mentioned 
is that in Ukraine it is possible to speak only of public 
enforcement, as any attempt at private enforcement has 
little hope of success due to the weak state of the judicial 
system. There are three level of enforcement: 
1. effective company control systems and management 
dedicated to good reporting, 
2. independent auditors who are expert in the rules, and 
3. an oversight mechanism with sufficient expertise 
and power to achieve effective enforcement (Brown 
and Tarca, 2005).
The first level of enforcement, the internal level, 
is a function of the incentives for financial reporting. 
Consequently, if the incentives for financial reporting are 
weak, the internal level of enforcement is also weak.
As for the second level, here is a very accurate quote 
which, although it refers to all Central and Eastern 
European countries, describes perfectly the situation 
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in Ukraine: "We propose that the auditors' role is more 
important when other enforcement mechanisms ... are 
weak or almost non-existent" (Albu and Albu, 2012:p.349). 
In this author's opinion, this level is the best compo-
nent of enforcement. Ukraine was the first of the former 
Soviet Union countries to switch to International Auditing 
Standards, which have been national auditing standards in 
Ukraine since 1997, and audit is performed according to 
them. In my view, the effectiveness of this second compo-
nent justifies assigning regulation in this area to profes-
sional organisations, and not the state.
Concerning the third level of enforcement, Ukraine 
uses enforcement by the Stock Exchange Regulator as a 
type of institutional oversight mechanism, according to 
Brown and Tarca classification (Brown and Tarca, 2005). 
The National Commission on Securities and the Stock 
Market is a state collegiate body subordinate to the 
President of Ukraine and accountable to the Verkhovna 
Rada of Ukraine.
The third level of enforcement is constantly being 
improved, but in my opinion, the level is still insufficient.
4.3 On complementarities
Out of the three main elements of New Institutional 
Accounting theory, the most complicated in Ukraine's 
case is the situation with complementarities, since the 
institutional inheritance that Ukraine received from the 
Soviet Union and its subsequent sporadic way of correct-
ing it has led to a confusing system, and the accumulation 
of various institutions.
However, up to now we still do not fully understand what 
is meant by "the necessary or sufficient set of institutions 
to truly implement IFRS" (Wysocki, 2011:p.323). What is 
clear, however, is that "if a country does not have strong 
supporting institutions, then financial reporting is likely 
to be ineffective in the country" (Wysocki, 2011:p.323). 
The presence of a code law environment, a top-down reg-
ulation mentality, and the generally low level of compe-
tition are hardly conducive for IFRS to flourish as these 
conditions epitomise the very opposite of an environment 
lending itself naturally to IFRS.
A simple example of complementarities concerns the use 
of the concept of "the public interest". The concept of the 
public interest goes hand in hand with IFRS in the Western 
model (Dellaportas and Davenport, 2008), but at the same 
time, it is not mentioned in Ukrainian legislation or any reg-
ulatory acts or standards at all. Can the accounting profes-
sion function properly if it does not serve the public interest? 
The question is, of course, rhetorical, but it clearly empha-
sises the important roles played by different institutional 
mechanisms and the possible interplay between them.
In closing, based on NIA pillars and on my analysis of 
IFRS adoption in Ukraine I will now summarise my find-
ings using a comprehensive model; Fig. 1 depicts the logi-
cal framework model of IFRS adoption within a particular 
jurisdiction.
The logic here is that the same technical standards 
adopted in a particular jurisdiction will inevitably lead to 
unique reporting practices. Moreover, as has already been 
noted, the broader IFRS proliferate, the greater the vari-
ation will be among these practices. While they may be 
adopted simultaneously, standards can only be adopted, 
over time, under the influence of local institutional fea-
tures. Consequently, unique local practices will be created 
due to differences in reporting incentives, enforcement 
mechanisms and institutional complementarities.
5 Discussion and conclusions
This paper examined the consequences of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption in Ukraine 
through the lens of new institutional accounting theory. 
The effects of IFRS adoption on management reporting 
incentives, enforcement and institutional complementar-
ities were all analysed. I found that Ukraine preparers' 
reporting incentives imply low quality; Ukraine has no 
strict enforcement mechanism and no strong market-based 
reporting incentives already in place (two main compo-
nents of NIA). Hence, it can be concluded that adoption on 
a technical level is not enough to be truly called "adoption", 
since profound changes on the institutional level are also 
required. Once adopted, IFRS are subjected to the same 
type of institutional and market pressures that gave rise to 
the old set of standards and as a result, the practice of finan-
cial reporting in Ukraine remains essentially unchanged 
while only new technical rules apply. To improve mat-
ters, jurisdictions similar to Ukraine should not only pur-
sue technical adoption but should also strive to align as 
closely as possible all the institutional aspects of this issue. 
Reporting incentives, enforcement and complementarities 
are closely intertwined and should not be considered as 
separate items. Reliable financial reporting will only come 
together with strong enforcement/reporting incentives.
Approaching local practices with a "technical mental-
ity" is not a good way to adopt international standards, and 
not only those that apply to accounting, to one's local sit-
uation as the institutional aspects of such an adoption also 
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need to be thoughtfully reconsidered. If this is not done, 
there is a danger that implementation could lead to results 
that are the very opposite of what was intended.
International standards can be adopted, but the 
approaches taken to this differ between jurisdictions. 
Inserted into different institutional settings, they may pro-
duce incongruent results. Consequently, institutionally 
speaking global standards are not truly global, as only part 
of them can be adopted "close" to expectations, whereas 
another part will be adopted only as closely as local insti-
tutions allow it. IFRS are adoptable, but in the course of 
this adoption, changes occur that inevitably lead to the 
incomparability of the financial statements across jurisdic-
tions. So can we say that implementations of international 
standards comparable? In terms of technical mentality, the 
answer will be yes, but in terms of institutional account-
ing the answer is no, such comparability is not possible, as 
demonstrated by the experience of Ukraine.
In pure theory, the adoption of IFRS should have led 
to an improvement to the increased quality of financial 
reporting; however, again, this is true only if we apply 
a "technical mentality". If we instead apply an "institu-
tional mentality", we should take into account the prac-
tice of financial reporting, which has not changed signifi-
cantly. Adopted IFRS have been subjected to the same 
type of institutional and market pressures that gave rise 
to the old set of standards and as result, international con-
vergence in reporting practices is scarcely attainable. 
Again, the emphasis is on practice as opposed to merely 
theory, and on attention to institutions. If, as in Ukraine, 
Fig. 1 Logical framework model of IFRS adoption according to NIA
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reporting incentives are unchanged or have undergone 
only slight adjustments then there are no reasons to expect 
any momentum in terms of changes to "accounting on the 
ground". Adopted IFRS does not change the fact that the 
incentives of preparers and enforcers remain "primarily 
local" (Nobes and Stadler, 2013:p.574).
The quality of financial reporting and its comparabil-
ity ultimately depend on management's reporting incen-
tives. The best advice for all jurisdictions that are similar 
to Ukraine in terms of institutional infrastructure would 
be to strengthen management's reporting incentives. 
The financial reporting incentives need to be changed, and 
the institutions that form them have to be changed grad-
ually. Due to the existence of complementarities, changes 
to a country's accounting standards cannot be considered 
in isolation from other institutions in a country.
Hence, technical adoption of IFRS is possible, but 
proper institutional adoption remains an unaccomplished 
feat. Once again, we can say that we can adopt IFRS, 
yet we cannot adopt it properly. Having global standards 
enshrined in the country's legislative field is not enough, 
instead there need to be some complementary institu-
tions to support the effective application and enforcement 
of uniform global standards. The application of IFRS 
at a merely technical level becomes meaningless and as 
a result, standards become increasingly local – the very 
opposite of the outcome IASB is striving for.
Is there a way out? The way forward is to strengthen 
management's reporting incentives and enforcement 
mechanisms through the construction of appropriate for-
mal institutions and the restructuring of informal ones. 
Although convergence in reporting practices is scarcely 
attainable, we are obliged to strive to achieve it.
The paper is of course far from the final word on this 
issue. Future research will need to concentrate on assess-
ing the relative contribution of standards and incentives to 
the process and the theory of gradual adoption of global 
standards based on P. Bourdieu's social theory.
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